FOR NEARLY a century, this lengthy 1892 article by Seventh Cavalry survivor Edward Godfrey was considered the most authoritative account of the Battle of the Little Bighorn.
Godfrey's narrative is very strong on the American side of the story -- he was a participant in the battle and he knew all the Americans personally -- but he is correspondingly weak on the Indian side of the story, which is crucial to understanding what happened at the Battle of the Little Bighorn.
In recent years, information has come to light which challenges just about all of Godfrey's conclusions in the following article.
Despite these problems, however, Edward Godfrey's Century article remains a major piece in the eye-witness puzzle of what happened on June 25, 1876 on the banks of the Little Bighorn and the bluffs above. If you want to understand what happened that day, you still need to read Edward Godfrey's Century article...
-- Bruce Brown
ON THE 16th of April, 1876, at McComb City, Missouri, I received orders to report my troop ("K" 7th Cavalry) to the Commanding General of the Department of Dakota, at St. Paul, Minnesota. At the latter place about twenty-five recruits fresh from civil life joined the troop, and we were ordered to proceed to Fort Abraham Lincoln, Dakota, where the Yellowstone Expedition was being organized. This expedition consisted of the 7th United States Cavalry, commanded by General George A. Custer, 28 officers and about 700 men; two companies of the 17th United States Infantry, and one company of the 6th United States Infantry, 8 officers and 135 men; one platoon of Gatling Guns, 2 officers and 32 men (of the 20th United States Infantry); and 40 "Ree" Indian scouts. The expeditionary forces were commanded by Brigadier-General Alfred H. Terry, the Department Commander, who, with his staff arrived several days prior to our departure.
On the 17th of May, at 5 a. m., the "general" (the signal to take down tents and break camp) was sounded, the wagons were packed and sent to the Quartermaster, and by six o'clock the wagon-train was on the road escorted by the Infantry. By seven o'clock the 7th Cavalry was marching in column of platoons around the paradeground of Fort Lincoln, headed by the band playing "Garry Owen," the Seventh's battle tune, first used when the regiment charged at the battle of Washita. The column was halted and dismounted just outside the garrison. The officers and married men were permitted to leave the ranks to say "good-bye" to their families. General Terry, knowing the anxiety of the ladies, had assented to, or ordered, this demonstration in order to allay their fears and satisfy them, by the formidable appearance we made, that we were able to cope with any enemy that we might expect to meet. Not many came out to witness the pageant, but many tearfilled eyes looked from the latticed windows.
During this halt the wagon-train was assembled on the plateau west of the post and formed in column of fours. When it started off the "assembly" was sounded and absentees joined their commands. The signals "mount" and "forward" were sounded, and the regiment marched away, the band playing "The Girl I Left Behind Me."
The 7th Cavalry was divided into two columns, designated right and left wings, commanded by Major Marcus A. Reno and Captain F. W. Benteen. Each wing was subdivided into two battalions of three troops each. After the first day the following was the habitual order of march: one battalion was advance guard, one was rear guard, and one marched on each flank of the train. General Custer with one troop of the advance guard, went ahead and selected the route for the train and the camping places at the end of the day's march. The other two troops of the advance guard reported at headquarters for pioneer or fatigue duty, to build bridges and creek crossings. The rear-guard kept behind everything; when it came up to a wagon stalled in the mire, it helped to put the wagon forward. The battalions on the flanks were kept within five hundred yards of the trail and not to get more than half a mile in advance or rear of the train, and to avoid dismounting any oftener than necessary. The march was conducted as follows: one troop marched until about half a mile in advance of the train, when it was dismounted, the horses unbitted and allowed to graze until the train had passed and was about half a mile in advance of it, when it took up the march again; each of the other two troops would conduct their march in the same manner, so that two troops on each flank would be marching alongside the train all the time. If the country was much broken, a half dozen flankers were thrown out to guard against surprise. The flankers regulated their march so as to keep abreast of their troops. The pack animals and beef herd were driven alongside the train by the packers and herders.
One wagon was assigned to each troop, and transported five days' rations and forage and the mess kit of the troop; also the mess kit, tents, and baggage of the troop officers and ten days' supplies for the officers' mess. The men were armed with the carbine and revolver; no one, not even the officer of the day, carried the sabre. Each troop horse carried, in addition to the rider, between eighty and ninety pounds. This additional weight included all equipments and about one hundred rounds of ammunition, fifty in the belt and fifty in saddlebags.
The wagon-train consisted in all of about one hundred and fifty wheeled vehicles. In it were carried thirty days' supplies of forage and rations (excepting beef), and two hundred rounds of ammunition per man. The two-horse wagons, hired by contract, carried from fifteen hundred to two thousand pounds. The six-mule government wagons carried from three to five thousand pounds, depending on the size and condition of the mules. The Gatling guns were each hauled by four condemned cavalry horses and marched in advance of the train. Two light wagons loaded with axes, shovels, pick-axes and some pine boards and scantling, sufficient for a short bridge, accompanied the "pioneer" troops. The "crossings" as they are termed, were often very tedious and would frequently delay the train several hours. During this time the cavalry horses were unbitted and grazed, the men holding the reins. Those men not on duty at the crossing slept, or collected in groups to spin yarns and take a whiff at their "dingy dudeens." The officers usually collected near the crossing to watch progress, and passed the time in conversation and playing practical jokes. About noon the "strikers" who carried the haversacks, were called, and the different messes had their luncheon, sometimes separately, sometimes clubbing together.
When the haversacks were opened the horses usually stopped grazing and put their noses near their riders' faces and asked very plainly to share their hardtack. If their polite request did not receive attention they would paw the ground, or even strike their riders. The old soldier was generally willing to share with his beast.
The length of the day's march, varying from ten to forty miles, was determined in a great measure by the difficulties or obstacles encountered, by wood, water and grass, and by the distance in advance where such advantages were likely to be found. If, about two or three o'clock in the afternoon, a column of smoke was seen in the direction of the trail and a mile or two in advance, it was a pretty sure indication that a camp had been selected. The cavalry, excepting the rear guard, would then cut loose from the train and go directly to camp. The rear guard would send details to collect fuel and unpack their wagons. The adjutant showed the wing commanders the general direction their lines or tents were to run, and the latter then directed the battalion or troop commanders to their camping places. Generally one flank of each line would rest near the creek. The general form of the command was that of a parallelogram. The wings camped on the long sides facing each other, and the headquarters and guard were located at one end nearest the creek. The wagon train was packed to close the other end and was guarded by the infantry battalion. The troops, as they arrived at their places were formed in line, facing inward, dismounted, unsaddled, and, if the weather was hot and the sun shining, the men rubbed the horses' backs until dry. After this the horses were sent to water and put out to graze, with side-lines and lariats, under charge of the stable guard, consisting of one non-commissioned officer and three or six privates. The men of the troop then collected fuel, sometimes wood, often a mile or more distant from the camp; sometimes "buffalo chips." The main guard, or camp guard, consisting usually of four or five noncommissioned officers and twelve or fifteen privates, reported mounted at headquarters, and were directed to take posts on prominent points overlooking the camp and surrounding country, to guard against surprise. Each post consisted of one non-commissioned officer and three privates. The officer of the day, in addition to his ordinary duties in camp, had charge of the safety of the cavalry herds.
Sometimes this latter duty was performed by an officer designated as "Officer of the Herd." To preserve the grazing in the immediate vicinity of the camp for evening and night grazing, all horses were required to be outside of the camp limits until retreat. When the train arrived, the headquarters and troop wagons went directly to the camping-place of their respective commands. The officers' baggage and tents were unloaded first; then the wagons went near the place where the troop kitchen was to be located, always on that flank of the troop farthest from headquarters. The teamsters unharnessed their mules and put them out to graze. The old stable guard reported to the troop commander for fatigue duty to put up the officers' tents and collect fuel for their mess. The troop officers' tents were usually placed twentyfive yards in rear of the line of men's tents and facing toward them. Their cook or mess tent was placed about ten or fifteen yards further to the rear. The "striker" made down the beds and arranged the "furniture," so to speak, which generally consisted of a camp-stool, tin wash-basins, and a looking glass. The men put up their tents soon after caring for their horses. The fronts of their tents were placed on a line established by stretching a picket rope. The first sergeant's was on that flank of the line nearest to the headquarters. The horse equipments were placed on a line three yards in front of the tents. The men were not prohibited from using their saddles as pillows. A trench was dug for the mess fire, and the grass was burned around it for several yards to prevent prairie fires. After this the cooks busied themselves preparing supper. Beef was issued soon after the wagon train came in, and the necessary number of beeves were butchered for the next day's issue; this was hauled in the wagons. Stable call was sounded about an hour before sunset. The men of each troop were formed on the parade and marched to the horse herds by the first sergeant. Each man went to his own horse, took off the sidelines and fastened them around the horse's neck, then pulled the picket pin, coiled the lariat, noosed the end fastened to the head halter around the horse's muzzle, mounted, and assembled in line at a place indicated by the first sergeant. The troop was then marched to the watering place, which was usually selected with great care because of the boggy banks and miry beds of the prairie streams. After watering, the horses were lariated outside the vicinity of the camp. The ground directly in the rear of the troop belonged to it, and was jealously guarded by those concerned against encroachment by others. After lariating their horses, the men got their curry-combs, brushes, and nose-bags and went to the troop wagon where the quartermaster sergeant and farrier measured, with tin cups, the forage to each man, each watching jealously that he got as much for his horse as those before him. He then went at once to feed and groom his horse. The officer whose duty it was to attend stables and the first sergeant superintended the grooming, examining each horse's back and feet carefully to see if they were all right. When a horse's back got sore, through the carelessness of the rider, the man would generally be compelled to lead his horse until the sore was well. Immediately after stables, the cooks announced in a loud tone "Supper!" The men with haversack and tincup went to the mess fire and got their hardtack, meat, and coffee. If game had been killed the men did a little extra cooking themselves.
The troop officers' mess kits consisted of a sheetiron cooking stove, an iron kettle, stewing, frying, baking, and dish pans; a small Dutch oven, a camp kettle, a mess-chest holding tableware for four persons, and a small folding table. The table in fair weather was spread in the open air. The early part of the meal was a matter of business, but after the substantials were stowed away, the delicacies were eaten more leisurely and time found for conversation. After supper the pipes were lighted, and the officers, if the weather was cold, went to the [leeward] side of the camp fire. Each man, as he took his place, was sure to poke or kick the fire, turn his back, hitch up his coat tail, and fold his hands behind him.
Retreat was sounded a little after sunset and the roll was called, as much to insure the men having their equipments in place as to secure their presence, for it was not often we were near enough to any attraction to call the men away. (In 1876 there was not a ranch west of Bismarck, Dakota, nor east of Bozeman, Montana.) The stable guards began their tours of duty at this time. The noncommissioned officers reported to the troop commander for instructions for the night; these usually designated whether the horses were to be tied to the picket line or kept out to graze, and included special instructions for the care of sick or weak horses. At dusk all horses were brought within the limits of the camp. The picket-line was stretched over three wagons in front of the men's tents, or three posts were used when remaining in camp over a day.
During the evening, the men grouped about the fires and sang songs and spun yarns until "taps." The cooks prepared breakfast, which usually consisted of hard bread, bacon and coffee. If beans or fresh meat were to be cooked, the food was put into the Dutch ovens or camp-kettles, which were placed in the fire trench, covered over with hot ashes and coals, and afire was built over them. If the wind blew hard all fires were extinguished, to prevent prairie fires. The cooks were called an hour or an hour and a half before reveille. At the first call for reveille, usually 4:20 a. m., the stable guard awakened the occupants of each tent and the officer whose duty it was to attend the roll-call. Stable call followed reveille and was superintended by an officer. This occupied about three-quarters of an hour. Two hours after reveille, the command would be on the march. Of course, there were incidents that occasionally relieved the monotony.
Antelope were plentiful, and the men were encouraged by troop commanders to hunt. General Custer had a number of stag-hounds, which amused themselves and the command in their futile attempts to catch them. One morning they started up a large buck near where the column was marching; Lieutenant Hare immediately followed the hounds, passed them, drew his revolver, and shot the buck. Nothing of special interest occurred until the 27th of May, when we came to the Bad Lands of the Little Missouri River. On the 30th, General Custer was sent with four troops to make a scout up the Little Missouri, for about twenty miles. He returned the same day, without having discovered any recent "Indian signs." On the 31st we crossed the Little Missouri without difficulty. On the 1st and 2nd of June we were obliged to remain in camp on account of a snow-storm.
We remained in camp on the Powder River for three days. General Terry went to the Yellowstone to communicate with the supply steamer FAR WEST, which was at the mouth of the Powder River. He also went up the Yellowstone to communicate with General Gibbon's command, known as the "Montana Column," composed of four troops of the 2nd Cavalry and several companies of the 7th Infantry. Before General Terry left it was given out that the 7th Cavalry would be sent to scout up the Powder River, while the wagontrain, escorted by the infantry, would be sent to establish a supply camp at the mouth of the Powder.General Terry having returned, orders were issued on the tenth for the right wing, six troops under Major Reno, to make a scout up the Powder, provided with twelve days' rations.
The left wing was ordered to turn over all forage and rations; also the pack-mules, except four to each troop. Major Reno left at 3 p. m., and the next day the rest of the command marched to the mouth of the Powder. My troop was rear-guard, and at times we were over three miles in rear of the wagon-train waiting on the packers, for we had taken this opportunity to give them practical instruction.
Up to this time we had not seen an Indian, nor any recent signs of them, except one small trail of perhaps a half dozen tepees, evidently of a party of agency Indians on their way to join the hostile camp. The buffalo had all gone west; other game was scarce and wild. The indications were that the Indians were west of the Powder, and information from General Gibbon placed them south of the Yellowstone. Some of the officers of the right wing before they left expressed their belief that we would not find any Indians, and were sanguine that we would all get home by the middle of August.
Major Reno was ordered to scout to the forks of the Powder, then across to Mizpah Creek, follow it down to near its confluence with. the Powder; then cross over to Pumpkin Creek, follow it down to the Tongue River, scout up that stream and then rejoin the regiment at the mouth of the Tongue by the time his supplies were exhausted; unless, in the meantime, he should make some discovery that made it necessary to return sooner to make preparations for a pursuit. A supply depot was established at the mouth of the Powder, guarded by the infantry, at which the wagon-train was left.
General Terry, with his staff and some supplies, took passage on the supply steamer Far West, and went up to the mouth of the Tongue. General Custer with the left wing, marched to the mouth of the Tongue, where we remained until the 19th waiting tidings from Reno's scout. The grounds where we camped had been occupied by the Indians the previous winter. (Miles City, Montana, was first built on the site of this camp.) The rude shelters for their ponies, built of driftwood, were still standing and furnished fuel for our camp fires. A number of their dead, placed upon scaffolds, or tied to the branches of trees, were disturbed and robbed of their trinkets. Several persons rode about exhibiting their trinkets with as much gusto as if they were trophies of their valor, and showed no more concern for their desecration than if they had won them at a raffle. Ten days later I saw the bodies of these same persons dead, naked, and mutilated.
On the 19th of June tidings came from Reno that he had found a large trail that led up the Rosebud River. The particulars were not generally known. The camp was full of rumors; credulity was raised to the highest pitch, and we were filled with anxiety and curiosity until we reached Reno's command, and learned the details of their discoveries. They had found a large trail on the Tongue River, and had followed it up the Rosebud about forty miles, The number of lodges in the deserted villages was estimated by the number of camp-fires remaining to be about three hundred and fifty. The indications were that the trail was about three weeks old. No Indians had been seen nor any recent signs. It is not probable that Reno's movements were known to the Indians, for on the very day Reno reached his farthest point up the Rosebud, the battle of the Rosebud, between General Crook's forces and the Indians, was fought. The two commands were then not more than forty miles apart, but neither knew nor even suspected the proximity of the other. We reached the mouth of the Rosebud about noon of the 21st and began preparations for the march, and for the expected battle or pursuit.
On our arrival at the mouth of the Rosebud, Generals Terry, Gibbon and Custer had a conference on board the steamer "FAR WEST." It was decided that the 7th Cavalry, under General Custer, should follow the trail discovered by Reno. "Officers' call" was sounded in the 7th Cavalry camp as soon as the conference had concluded. Upon assembling, General Custer gave us our orders. We were to transport, on our pack-mules, fifteen days' rations of hard bread, coffee and sugar; twelve days' rations of bacon, and fifty rounds of carbine ammunition per man. Each man was to be supplied with 100 rounds of carbine and 24 rounds of pistol ammunition, to be carried on his person and in his saddle bags. Each man was to carry on his horse twelve pounds of oats.
The pack-mules sent out with Reno's command were badly used up, and promised seriously to embarrass the expedition. General Custer recommended that some extra forage be carried on the pack-mules. In endeavoring to carry out this recommendation some troop commanders (Captain MoyIan and myself) foresaw the difficulties, and told the General that some of the mules would certainly break down, especially if the extra forage was packed. He replied in an unusually emphatic manner. "Well, gentlemen, you may carry what supplies you please; you will be held responsible for your companies. The extra forage was only a suggestion, but this fact bear in mind, we will follow the trail for fifteen days unless we catch them before that time expires, no matter how far it may take us from our base of supplies; we may not see the supply steamer again"; and, turning as he was about to enter his tent, he added: "You had better carry along an extra supply of salt; we may have to live on horse meat before we get through." He was taken at his word, and an extra supply of salt was carried. "Battalion" and "wing" organizations were broken up, and troop commanders were responsible only to General Custer. Of course, as soon as it was determined that we were to go out, nearly every one took time to write letters home, but I doubt very much if there were many of a cheerful nature. Some officers made their wills; others gave verbal instructions as to the disposition of personal property and distribution of mementos; they seemed to have a presentiment of their fate.
There were a number of Sioux Indians who never went to an agency except to visit friends and relatives and to barter. They camped in and roamed about the buffalo country. Their camp was the rendezvous for the agency Indians when they went out for their annual hunts for meats and robes. They were known as the "Hostiles," and comprised representatives from all the different tribes of the Sioux nation. [Note: Also known as the "free Sioux and Cheyenne."] Many of them were renegade outlaws from the agencies. In their visits to the agencies they were usually arrogant and fomenters of discord. Depredations had been made upon the commerce to the Black Hills, and a number of lives taken by them or by others, for which they were blamed. The authorities at Washington had determined to compel these Indians to reside at the agencies-hence the Sioux War.
Major James McLaughlin, United States Indian Agent, stationed at the Devil's Lake Agency, Dakota, from 1870 to 1881, and at Standing Rock Agency, Dakota, from 1881 to 1895, and to the present time Inspector in the Bureau of Indian Affairs, has made it a point to get estimates of the number of Indians at the hostile camp at the time of the battle. In his opinion, and all who know him will accept it with confidence, about one-third of the whole Sioux nation, including the northern Cheyennes and Arapahoes, were present at the battle; he estimates the number present as between twelve and fifteen thousand; that one out of four is a low estimate in determining the numher of warriors present; every male over fourteen years of age may be considered a warrior in a general fight, such as was the battle of the Little Big Horn; also, considering the extra hazards of the hunt and expected battle, fewer squaws would accompany the recruits from the agencies. The minimum strength of their fighting men may then be put down as between twenty-five hundred and three thousand. Information was dispatched from General Sheridan that from the agencies about 1800 lodges had set out to join the hostile camp; but that information did not reach General Terry until several days after the battle. The principal warrior chiefs of the hostile Indians were Gall, Crow King and Black Moon, Huncpapa Sioux; Low Dog, Crazy Horse and Big Road, Ogallala Sioux; Spotted Eagle, Sans-Arc Sioux; Hump of the Minneconjous; and White Bull and Little Horse of the Cheyennes. To these belong the chief honors of conducting the battle; how- ever, Gall, Crow King and Crazy Horse were the ruling spirits.
Sitting Bull, a Huncpapa Sioux Indian, was the chief of the hostile camp; he had about sixty lodges of followers on whom he could at all times depend. He was the host of the Hostiles, and as such received and entertained their visitors. These visitors gave him many presents, and he was thus enabled to make many presents, in return. All visitors paid tribute to him, so he gave liberally to the most influential, the chiefs, i. e. he "put it where it would do the most good." In this way he became known as the chief of the hostile camp, and the camp was generally known as "Sitting Bull's camp" or "outfit." Sitting Bull was a heavy set, muscular man, about five feet eight inches in stature, and at the time of the battle of the Little Big Horn was forty-two years of age. He was the autocrat of the camp---chiefly because he was the host. In council his views had great weight, because he was known as a great medicine man. He was a chief, but not a warrior chief. In the war councils he had a voice and vote the same as any other chief. A short time previous to the battle he had "made medicine," had predicted that the soldiers would attack them and that the soldiers would all be killed. He took no active part in the battle, but, as was his custom in time of danger, remained in the village "making medicine." Personally, he was regarded by the Agency Indians as a great coward and a very great liar, "a man with a big head and a little heart."
The War Chief Gall
Chief Gall was born about 1840, of Huncpapa parents. Until Sitting Bull's surrender, 1881, Gall never lived at the agencies, but was sometimes a guest. When 25 years old he was noted for his bravery and daring. He was so subtle, crafty and daring, that in 1886 (1866?), the military authorities offered a reward for his body, dead or alive; an outrage had been committed, which for daring and craftiness, it was thought no other Indian was gifted. However, he was innocent. Gall knew of the price laid on his carcass and kept away from the military. At Fort Berthold, while visiting friends at the Agency, his visit was made known to the commanding officer at Fort Stevenson, a few miles away. A detachment was sent to the tepee where he was visiting, to arrest him. On their entrance Gall dropped on his belly and pushed himself backward under the tepee. A soldier on the outside bayonetted him through the body and held him till he fainted. The soldiers supposed him to be dead, and so reported to their commander. They were sent back with transportation to get the body. Great was their astonishment to find that Gall had recovered consciousness and crawled away. The men searched faithfully the woods in which Gall had concealed himself, but he was not discovered. Gall then got back to his people and vowed vengeance. He had it in many a foray and numbers of battles. He lurked about the military posts and pounced on luckless promenaders, even at the very gates of the stockade that enclosed the barracks and quarters. He raided settlements and attacked Black Hill stages and freighters. He it was who followed the "Bozeman Expedition" about 1874, for days, when they were searching for gold, compelling them at all times to be in readiness for battle. One of their entrenchments may yet be seen on the divide between the Rosebud and Little Big Horn at the head of Thompson Creek.
In 1872 he led his braves in a raiding attack on the 2nd Cavarly at "Baker's Battlefield" on the Yellowstone, which by reason of its surprise, came near proving a disaster, as Indians rarely made night attacks. August 4th, 1873, General Custer had gone into bivouac on the north bank of the Yellowstone, just above Fort Keogh, waiting for the main command under General Stanley. The two troops had unsaddled and were resting in the supposed security afforded by the absence of fresh "Indian signs," while Gall made his dispositions for attack. His warriors crawled through woods, down ravines and under the river bank to within 300 yards when an alarm called to arms and a lively battle was kept up until the arrival of troops from the main command which had heard and seen the firing from the mesa several miles away. A week later Gall made an attack on the 7th Cavalry at the head of "Peace Bottom," a few miles below the mouth of the Big Horn. In this fight Gall, dressed in brilliant scarlet and war bonnet, rode back and forth in front of the firing line, the target of hundreds of shots, but escaped unharmed. He was the Great War Chief of all the Sioux at "Custer's Last Battle." In 1877 he went with Sitting Bull to Canada, and in 1881 surrendered at Poplar Creek, Montana. The band was taken into Standing Rock Agency, 1882, by steamboat. The boat was met by a great throng of people; the military, settlers and employees and Indians of that Agency were at the landing. When the boat tied up, Gall, in full war paint and regalia ostentatiously walked down the gang plank, halted and surveyed the surroundings. His old mother ran to him and tried to gain his notice; she got on her knees, clasped him about his legs took hold of and kissed his hand; she moaned and cried. Ignoring her caresses, he stalked dramatically aboard the boat. Later Gall became reconciled to agency life and was a good Indian; wise and conservative, he supported the Agent, Major James McLaughlin, in all his efforts for the good of the people. In the grand councils of all the Chiefs of the Sioux nation, he was the most influential and stood up for what he considered the just rights of his people. He died at Oak Creek, near Standing Rock Agency, in 1895. His features were massive, and in facial appearance was compared to the great expounder, Webster; to Henry Ward Beecher and to Bishop Newman. He was a man of great natural ability, force of character and possessed great common sense.
General Custer's written instructions were as follows:
Camp at Mouth of Rosebud River, Montana Territory, June 22nd, 1876.
The Brigadier-General Commanding directs that, as soon as your regiment can be made ready for the march, you will proceed up the Rosebud in pursuit of the Indians whose trail was discovered by Major Reno a few days since. It is, of course, impossible to give you any definite instructions in regard to this movement, and were it not impossible to do so, the Department Commander places too much confidence in your zeal, energy, and ability to wish to impose upon you precise orders which might hamper your action when nearly in contact with the enemy. He will, however, indicate to you his own views of what your action should be, and he desires that you should conform to them unless you shall see sufficient reason for departing from them. He thinks that you should proceed up the Rosebud until you ascertain definitely the direction in which the trail above spoken of leads. Should it be found (as it appears almost certain that it will be found to turn towards the Little Horn, he thinks that you should still proceed southward, perhaps as far as the headwaters of the Tongue, and then turn towards the Little Horn, feeling constantly, however, to your left, so as to preclude the possibility of the escape of the Indians to the south or southeast by passing around your left flank. The column of Colonel Gibbon is now in motion for the mouth of the Bighorn. As soon at is reaches that point it will cross the Yellowstone and move up at least as far as the forks of the Big and Little Horns. Of course its future movements must be controlled by circumstances as they arise, but it is hoped that the Indians, if upon the Little Horn, may be so nearly inclosed by the two columns that their escape will be impossible.
The Department Commander desires that on your way up the Rosebud you should thoroughly examine the upper part of Tullock's Creek, and that you should endeavor to send a scout through to Colonel Gibbon's column, with information of the result of your examination. The lower part of the creek will be examined by a detachment from Colonel Gibbon's command. The supply steamer will be pushed up the Bighorn as far as the forks if the river is found to be navigable for that distance, and the Department Commander, who will accompany the column of Colonel Gibbon, desires you to report to him there not later than the expiration of the time for which your troops are rationed, unless in the meantime you receive further orders.
Very respectfully, Your obedient servant,
E. W. Smith,
These instructions are explicit, and fixed the location of the Indians very accurately. It has been assumed by some writers that General Terry's command would be at the mouth of the Little Bighorn on June 26th, and that General Custer knew of that-also by some that the two commands were to come together about that date at that place. General Terry's instructions do not say when his command would reach that point, and according to the instructions, General Custer was not necessarily expected there before the 5th or 6th of July, being rationed for fifteen days.
At twelve o'clock, noon, on the 22nd of June, the "Forward" was sounded, and the regiment marched out of camp in column of fours, each troop followed by its pack-mules. Generals Terry, Gibbon and Custer stationed themselves near our line of march and reviewed the regiment. General Terry had a pleasant word for each officer as he returned the salute. Our pack-trains proved troublesome at the start, as the cargoes began falling off before we got out of camp, and during all that day the mules straggled badly. After that day, however, they were placed under the charge of Lieutenant Mathey, who was directed to report at the end of each day's march the order of merit of the efficiency of the troop packers. Doubtless, General Custer had some ulterior design in this. It is quite probable that if he had had occasion to detach troops requiring rapid marching, he would have selected those troops whose packers had the best records. At all events the efficiency was much increased, and after we struck the Indian trail the pack-trains kept well closed. We went into camp about 4 p. m., having marched twelve miles. About sunset "officers' call" was sounded, and we assembled at General Custer's bivouac and squatted in groups about the General's bed. It was not a cheerful assemblage; everybody seemed to be in a serious mood, and the little conversation carried on, before all had arrived, was in undertones. When all had assembled, the General said that until further orders, trumpet calls would not be sounded except in an emergency; the marches would begin at 5 a. m. sharp; the troop commanders were all experienced officers, and knew well enough what to do, and when to do what was necessary for their troops; there were two things that would be regulated from his headquarters, i.e. when to move out of and when to go into camp. All other details, such as reveille, stables, watering, halting, grazing, etc., on the march would be left to the judgment and discretion of the troop commanders; they were to keep within supporting distance of each other, not to get ahead of the scouts, or very far to the rear of the column. He took particular pains to impress upon the officers his reliance upon their judgment, discretion, and loyalty. He thought, judging from the number of lodge-fires reported by Reno, that we might meet at least a thousand warriors; there might be enough young men from the agencies, visiting their hostile friends, to make a total of fifteen hundred, [Note: it now appears Custer's estimate was very accurate.] He had consulted the reports of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and the officials while in Washington as to the probable number of "Hostiles" (those who had persistently refused to live or enroll themselves at the Indian agencies), and he was confident, if any reliance was to be placed upon these reports, that there would not be an opposing force of more than fifteen hundred. General Terry had offered him the additional force of the battalion of the 2nd Cavalry, but he had declined it because he felt sure that the 7th Cavalry could whip any force that would be able to combine against him, that if the regiment could not, no other regiment in the service could; if they could whip the regiment, they would be able to defeat a much larger force, or, in other words, the reinforcement of this battalion could not save us from defeat. With the regiment acting alone, there would be harmony, but another organization would be sure to cause jealousy or friction. He had declined the offer of the Gatling guns for the reason that they might hamper our movements or march at a critical moment, because of the inferior horses and of the difficult nature of the country through which we would march. The marches would be from twenty-five to thirty miles a day. Troop officers were cautioned to husband their rations and the strength of their mules and horses, as we might be out for a great deal longer time than that for which we were rationed, as he itended to follow the trail until we could get the Indians, even if it took us to the Indian agencies on the Missouri River or in Nebraska. All officers were requested to make to him any suggestions they thought fit.
This "talk" of his, as we called it, was considered at the time as something extraordinary for General Custer, for it was not his habit to unbosom himself to his officers. In it he showed concessions and a reliance on others; there was an indefinable something that was not Custer. His manner and tone, usually brusque and aggressive, or somewhat curt, was on this occasion conciliating and subdued. There was something akin to an appeal, as if depressed, that made a deep impression on all present. We compared watches to get the official time, and separated to attend to our various duties. Lieutenants McIntosh, Wallace (killed at the Battle of Wounded Knee, December 29, 1890), and myself walked to our bivouac, for some distance in silence, when Wallace remarked: "Godfrey, I believe General Custer is going to be killed." "Why? Wallace," I replied, "what makes you think so?" "Because," said he, "I have never heard Custer talk in that way before."
I went to my troop and gave orders what time the "silent" reveille should be and as to other details for the morning preparations; also the following directions in case of a night attack: the stable guard, packers, and cooks were to go out at once to the horses and mules to quiet and guard them; the other men were to go at once to a designated rendezvous and await orders; no man should fire a shot until he received orders from an officer to do so. When they retired for the night they should put their arms and equipments where they could get them without leaving their beds. I then went through the herd to satisfy myself as to the security of the animals. During the performance of this duty I came to the bivouac of the Indian scouts. "Mitch" Bouyer, the half-breed interpreter, "Bloody Knife," the chief of the Ree scouts; "Half-Yellow-Face," the chief of the Crow scouts, and others were having a "talk." I observed them for a few minutes, when Bouyer turned toward me, apparently at the suggestion of "Half-Yellow-Face" and said; "Have you ever fought against these Sioux?" "Yes," I replied. Then he asked, "Well, how many do you expect to find?" I answered, "it is said we may find between one thousand and fifteen hundred." "Well, do you think we can whip that many?" "Oh, yes, I guess so." After he had interpreted our conversation, he said to me with a good deal of emphasis, "Well, I can tell you we are going to have a damned big fight." At five o'clock sharp, on the morning of the 23rd, General Custer mounted and started up the Rosebud, followed by two sergeants, one carrying the regimental standard, and the other his personal or headquarters flag, the same kind of flag he used while commanding his cavalry division during the Civil War. This was the signal for the command to mount and take up the march. Eight miles out we came to the first of the Indian camping-places. It certainly indicated a large village and numerous population. There were a great many "wickiups" (bushes stuck in the ground with the tops drawn together, over which they placed canvas or blankets). These we supposed at the time were for the dogs, but subsequent events developed the fact that they were temporary shelters of the transients from the agencies. During the day we passed through three of these camping-places and made halts at each one. Everybody was busy studying the age of the pony droppings and tracks and lodge trails, and endeavoring to determine the number of lodges. These points were all-absorbing topics of conversation. We went into camp about five o'clock; having marched about thirty-three miles.
June 24th we passed a great many camping places, all appearing to be of nearly the same strength. One would naturally suppose these were the successive camping-places of the same village, when, in fact, they were the continuous camps of the several bands. The fact that they appeared to be of nearly the same age, that is, having been made at the same time, did not impress us then. We passed through one much larger than any of the others. The grass for a considerable distance around it had been cropped close, indicating that large herds had been grazed there. The frame of a large "Sun-Dance" lodge was standing, and in it we found the scalp of a white man. It was whilst here that the Indians from the agencies had joined the Hostiles' camp. The command halted here and the "officers' call" was sounded. Upon assembling we were informed that our Crow scouts, who had been very active and efficient, had discovered fresh signs, the tracks of three or four ponies and one Indian on foot. At this point a stiff southerly breeze was blowing; as we were about to separate, the General's headquarters' flag was blown down, falling toward our rear. Being near the flag I picked it up and stuck the staff in the ground, but it again fell to the rear. I then bored the staff into the ground where it would have the support of a sagebrush. This circumstance made no impression on me at the time, but after the battle, an officer, Lieutenant Wallace, asked me if I remembered the incident. He had observed, and regarded the fact of its falling to the rear as a bad omen, and felt sure we would suffer a defeat. The march during the day was tedious. We made many long halts, so as not to get ahead of the scouts, who seemed to be doing their work thoroughly, giving special attention to the right, toward Tulloch's Creek, the valley of which was in general view from the divide. Once or twice signal smokes were reported in that direction, but investigation did not confirm the reports. The weather was dry and had been for some time, consequently the trail was very dusty. The troops were required to march on separate trails, so that the dust clouds would not rise so high. The valley was heavily marked with lodge-pole trails and pony tracks, showing that immense herds of ponies had been driven over it. About sundown we went into camp under the cover of a bluff, so as to hide the command as much as possible. We had marched about twenty-eight miles. The fires were ordered to be put out as soon as supper was over, and we were to be in readiness to march again at 11:30 p. m.
Lieutenant Hare and myself lay down about 9:30 to take a nap. When comfortably fixed, we heard some one say, "He's over there by that tree." As that described my location pretty well, I called out to know what was wanted, and the reply came: "The General's compliments, and he wants to see all the officers at headquarters immediately." So we gave up our much-needed rest and groped our way through horse herds, over sleeping men, and through thickets of bushes trying to find headquarters. No one could tell us, and as all fires and lights were out we could not keep our bearings. We finally espied a solitary candlelight, toward which we traveled and found most of the officers assembled at the General's bivouac. The General said that the trail led over the divide to the Little Bighorn; the march would be taken up at once, as he was anxious to get as near the divide as possible before daylight, where the command would be concealed during the day, and give ample time for the country to be studied, to locate the village, and to make plans for the attack on the 26th. We then returned to our troops, except Lieutenant Hare, who was put on duty with the scouts. Because of the dust, it was impossible to see any distance and the rattle of equipments and clattering of the horses' feet made it difficult to hear distinctly beyond our immediate surroundings. We could not see the trail and we could only follow it by keeping in the dust cloud. The night was very calm, but occasionally a slight breeze would waft the cloud and disconcert our bearings; then we were obliged to halt to catch a sound from those in advance, sometimes whistling or hallooing, and getting a response we could start forward again. Finally, troopers were put ahead, away from the noise of our column, and where they could hear the noise of those in front. A little after 2 a.m., June 25th, the command was halted to await further tidings from the scouts; we had marched about ten miles. Part of the command unsaddled to rest the horses. After daylight some coffee was made, but it was impossible to drink it; the water was so alkaline that the horses refused to drink.
Some time before eight o'clock, General Custer rode bareback to the several troops and gave orders to be ready to march at eight o'clock, and gave information that scouts had discovered the locality of the Indian villages or camps in the valley of the Little Bighorn, about twelve or fifteen miles beyond the divide. Just before setting out on the march, I went to where General Custer's bivouac was. The General, "Bloody Knife," and several Ree scouts and a half-breed interpreter were squatted in a circle, having a "talk" after the Indian fashion. The general wore a serious expression and was apparently abstracted. The scouts were doing the talking, and seemed nervous and disturbed. Finally "Bloody Knife" made a remark that recalled the General from his reverie, and he asked in his usual quick, brusque manner, "What's that he says?" The interpreter replied: "He says we'll find enough Sioux to keep up fighting two or three days." The General smiled and remarked, "I guess we'll get through with them in one day."
We started promptly at eight o'clock and marched uninterruptedly until 10:30 a.m. when we halted in a ravine and were ordered to preserve quiet, keep concealed, and not do anything that would be likely to reveal our presence to the enemy. We had marched about ten miles.
It is a rare occurrence in Indian warfare that gives a commander the opportunity to reconnoiter the enemy's position in daylight. This is particularly true if the Indians have a knowledge of the presence of troops in the country. When following an Indian trail the "signs" indicate the length of time elapsed since the presence of the Indians. When the "signs" indicate a "hot trail" i.e. near approach, the commander judges his distance and by a forced march, usually in the night time, tries to reach the Indian village at night and make his disposition for a surprise attack at daylight. At all events his attack must be made with celerity, and generally without other knowledge of the numbers of the opposing force than that discovered or conjectured while following the trail. The dispositions for the attack may be said to be "made in the dark," and successful surprise to depend upon luck. If the advance to the attack be made in daylight it is next to impossible that a near approach can be made without discovery. In all our previous experiences, when the immediate presence of the troops was once known to them, the warriors swarmed to the attack, and resorted to all kinds of ruses to mislead the troops, to delay the advance toward their camp or village while the squaws and children secured what personal effects they could, drove off the pony herd, and by flight put themselves beyond danger, and then scattering, made successful pursuit next to impossible. In civilized warfare the hostile forces may confront each other for hours, days or weeks, and the battle may be conducted with a tolerable knowledge of the numbers, positions, etc. of each other. A full knowledge of the immediate presence of the enemy does not imply immediate attack. In Indian warfare the rule is "touch and go." In fact, the firebrand nature of Indian warfare is not generally understood. In meditating upon the preliminaries of an Indian battle, old soldiers who have participated only in the battles of "civilized" war are apt to draw upon their own experiences for comparison, when there is no comparison.
It was well known to the Indians that the troops were in the field, and a battle was fully expected by them; but the close proximity of our column was not known to them until the morning of the day of the battle. Several young men had left the hostile camp on that morning to go to one of the agencies in Nebraska. They saw the dust made by the column of troops; some of their number returned to the village and gave warning that the troops were coming, so the attack was not a surprise. [Note: actually, it was a box of hardtack that bounced off a Seventh Cavalry pack mule and was subsequently found by the young Sioux boy Deeds that changed Custer's plans, and convinced him to attack on the 25th. Sgt. Hearst murdered Deeds, but two other Sioux youths got away to spread the alarm. Here is Drags The Rope's eye-witness account of the murder of Deeds, who was the first fatality of the Battle of the Little Bighorn, and the first of many victims of American war crimes that day. Godfrey is correct, though, that the free Sioux and Cheyenne did not realize how close Custer's troops were until the morning of the 25th, when Sioux scout Fast Horn brought word that Custer was at the Crow's Nest at dawn. Crazy Horse scrambled a party of Cheyenne decoy / scouts to intercept the American troops if they approached the village, but even so the attack caught the Sioux and Cheyenne napping, or in the case of Crazy Horse, bathing. According to the eye-witness account of Cheyenne holy man Yellow Nose, he and Crazy Horse were swimming in the Little Bighorn River when they heard the first shots. Here is more info on what the free Sioux and Cheyenne knew, and when they knew it.] For two or three days their camp had been pitched on the site where they were attacked. The place was not selected with the view to making that the battle-field of the campaign, but, whoever was in the van on their march thought it a good place to camp, put up his tepee, and the others as they arrived followed his example. (This was Gall's explanation.) It is customary among the Indians to camp by bands. The bands usually camp some distance apart, and Indians of the number then together would occupy a territory of several miles along the river valley, and not necessarily within supporting distance of each other. But in view of the possible fulfillment of Sitting Bull's prophecy the village had massed.
The Little Bighorn River, or the "Greasy Grass" as it is known to the Indians, is a rapid, tortuous mountain stream from twenty to forty yards wide, with pebbled bottom, but abrupt, soft banks. The water at the ordinary stage is from two or five feet in depth, depending upon the width of the channel. The general direction of its course is northeasterly down to the Little Bighorn battle-fields, where it trends northwesterly to its confluence with the Bighorn River. The other topographical features of the country which concern us in this narrative may be briefly described as follows: Between the Little Bighorn and Bighorn Rivers is a plateau of undulating prairie; between the Little Bighorn and the Rosebud are the Little Chetish or Wolf Mountains. By this it must not be misunderstood as a rocky upheaval chain or spur of mountains, but it is a rough, broken country of considerable elevation, of high precipitous hills and deep, narrow gulches. The command had followed the trail up a branch of the Rosebud to within, say, a mile of the summit of these mountains, which form the "divide." Not many miles to our right was the divide between the Little Bighorn and Tulloch's Fork. The creek that drained the watershed to our right and front is now variously called "Sun-Dance," Benteen's, or Reno's Creek. The trail, very tortuous; and sometimes dangerous, followed down the bed and valley of the south branch of this creek, which at that time was dry for the greater part of its length. It was from the divide between the Little Bighorn and the Rosebud that the scouts had discovered the smoke rising above the village, and the pony herds grazing in the valley of the Little Bighorn, somewhere about twelve or fifteen miles away. It was to their point of view that General Custer had gone while the column was halted in the ravine. It was impossible for him to discover more of the enemy than had already been reported by the scouts. In consequence of the high bluffs which screened the village, it was not possible in following the trail to discover more. Nor was there a point of observation near the trail from which further discoveries could be made until the battle was at hand.
Our officers had generally collected in groups and discussed the situation. Some sought solitude and sleep, or meditation. The Ree scouts, who had not been very active for the past day or two, were together and their "medicine man" was anointing them and invoking the Great Spirit to protect them from the Sioux. They seemed to have become satisfied that we were going to find more Sioux than we could well take care of. Captain Yates' troop had lost one of its packs of hard bread during the night march from our last halting place on the 24th. He had sent a detail back on the trail to recover it. Captain Keogh came to where a group of officers were and said this detail had returned and Sergeant Curtis, in charge, reported that when near the, pack they discovered an Indian opening one of the boxes of hard bread with his tomahawk, and that as soon as the Indian saw the soldiers he galloped away to the hills, out of range and then moved along leisurely. This information was taken to the General at once by his brother, Captain Tom Custer. The General came back and had "officers' call" sounded. He recounted Captain Keogh's report, and also said that the scouts had seen several Indians moving along the ridge overlooking the valley through which we had marched, as if observing our movements; he thought the Indians must have seen the dust made by the command. At all events, our presence had been discovered and further concealment was unnecessary; that we would move at once to attack the village; that he had not intended to make the attack until the next morning, the 26th, but our discovery made it imperative to act at once, as delay would allow the village to scatter and escape. Troop commanders were ordered to make a detail of one non-commissioned officer and six men to accompany the pack; to inspect their troops and report as soon as they were ready to march; that the troops would take their places in the column of march in the order in which reports of readiness were received; the last one to report would escort the pack-train.
THE DIVISION OF TROOPS
The inspections were quickly made and the column was soon en route. We crossed the dividing ridge between the Rosebud and Little Bighorn valleys a little before noon. Shortly afterward the regiment was divided into battalions. The advance battalion, under Major Reno, consisted of troop "M," Captain French; troop "A," Captain Moylan and Lieutenant De Rudio; troop "G," Lieutenants McIntosh and Wallace; the Indian scouts under Lieutenants Varnum and Hare, and the interpreter Girard; Lieutenant Hodgson was Acting Adjutant, and Doctors DeWolf and Porter were the medical officers. The battalion under General Custer was composed of troop "I," Captain Keogh and Lieutenant Porter; troop "F," Captain Yates and Lieutenant Reily; troop "C," Captain Custer and Lieutenant Harrington; troop "E," Lieutenants Smith and Sturgis; troop "L," Lieutenants Calhoun and Crittenden; Lieutenant Cook was the Adjutant, and Captain G. E. Lord was medical officer. (It is thought by some that Custer's troops were divided into two battalions, one under Captain Keogh and one under Captain Yates.) The battalion under Captain Benteen consisted of troop "H," Captain Benteen and Lieutenant Gibson; troop "D," Captain Weir and Lieutenant Edgerly, and troop "K," Lieutenant Godfrey. The pack-train, Lieutenant Mathey in charge, was under escort of troop "B," Captain McDougall.
Major Reno's battalion marched down a valley that developed into the south branch of the small tributary to the Little Bighorn, now called "Sun Dance" Benteen's, or Reno Creek. The Indian trail followed the meanderings of this valley. Custer's column followed Reno's closely, bearing to the right and rear. The pack-train followed their trail.
Benteen's battalion was ordered to the left and front, to a line of high bluffs about three or four miles distant. Benteen was ordered if he saw anything, to send word to Custer, but to pitch into anything he came across; if, when he arrived at the high bluffs, he could not see any enemy, he should continue his march to the next line of bluffs and so on. until he could see the Little Bighorn Valley.
There is no doubt that Custer was possessed with the idea that the Indians would not "stand" for a daylight attack, that some of them would try to escape up the valley of the Little Bighorn with families, ponies and other impedimenta, and if so, he wanted them intercepted and driven back toward the village. This idea and another that the village might be strung out along the valley for several miles were probably the ones that influenced him to send Benteen's battalion to the left. Benteen marched over a succession of rough steep hills and deep valleys. The view from the point where the regiment was organized into battalions did not discover the difficult nature of the country, but as we advanced farther, it became more and more difficult. To save the strain on the battalion, Lieutenant Gibson was sent some distance in advance, but saw no enemy, and so signaled the result of his reconnaissance to Benteen. The obstacles threw the battalion by degrees to the right until we came in sight of and not more than a mile from the trail. Many of our horses were greatly jaded by the climbing and descending, some getting far into the rear of the column. Benteen very wisely determined to follow the trail of the rest of the command, and we got into it just in advance of the pack-train. During this march on the left, we could see occasionally the battalion under Custer, distinguished by the troop mounted on gray horses, marching at a rapid gait. Two or three times we heard loud cheering and also some few shots, but the occasion of these demonstrations is not known. Some time after getting on the trail we came to a waterhole, or morass, at which a stream of running water had its source, Benteen halted the battalion. While watering, we heard some firing in advance, and Weir became impatient at the delay of watering and started off with his troop, taking the advance, whereas his place in column was second. The rest of the battalion moved out very soon afterward and soon caught up with him. We were now several miles from the Reno battle-field or the Little Bighorn. Just as we were leaving the water-hole, the pack-train was arriving, and the poor thirsty mules plunged into the morass in spite of the efforts of the packers to prevent them, for they had not had water since the previous evening. We passed a burning tepee, fired presumably by our scouts, in which was the body of a warrior who had been killed in the battle with Crook's troops on the Rosebud on the 17th of June.
The battalions under Reno and Custer did not meet any Indians until Reno arrived at the burning tepee; here a few were seen. These Indians did not act as if surprised by the appearance of troops; they made no effort to delay the column, but simply kept far enough in advance to invite pursuit. Reno's command and the scouts followed them closely until he received orders to "move forward at as rapid a gait as he thought prudent, and charge the village afterward, and the whole outfit would support him." According to Reno's official report this order was given him near this burning tepee. He says: "Lieutenant Cook, adjutant, came to me and said the village was only two miles above, and running away," and gave the above order.
The Little Bighorn bottom, down which the trail led, is generally flat, and from one to two miles wide; along the stream, especially in the bends at the time of the fight, it was heavily timbered, principally large cotton woods, and obstructed a view of the main villages until Reno got to where he made his farthest advance down the valley; here the village loomed up large among the cotton woods below. Reno following the Indian trail, crossed at a ford; about three and a half miles below it, in a direct line, is a second ford; between these fords, skirting the right bank and paralleling the river is a ridge from one hundred to three hundred feet above the valley, which rises abruptly from river and valley. In following the summit of this ridge the travel distance is considerably increased. The northeast slope declines rather gently at the upper end, but more abrup at the lower end, and drains into a usually dry stream bed which joins the river at the second ford. About two miles below this ford is another. These lower fords were used by the Hostiles in swarming to the attack on Custer's troops.
RENO'S FIGHT IN THE VALLEY
Reno's battalion moved at a trot to the river, where he delayed about ten or fifteen minutes watering the horses and reforming the column on the left bank of the stream; both Captain Keogh and Lieutenant Cook were at this crossing for a short time. Reno now sent word to Custer that he had everything in front of him, and that the enemy was strong. Custer had moved off to the right, being separated from Reno by a line of high bluffs and the river. Reno moved forward in column of fours about half a mile, then formed the battalion in line of battle across the valley with the scouts on the left; after advancing about a mile further he deployed the battalion as skirmishers. In the meantime, the Hostiles, continually reinforced, fell back, firing occasionally, but made no decided effort to check Reno's advance. The horses of two men became unmanageable and carried them into the Indian camp. The Indians now developed great force, opened a brisk fire, mounted, and made a dash toward the foothills on the left flank where the Ree scouts were. The scouts ignominiously fled, most of them abandoning the field altogether. Reno says in his report: "I however, soon saw that I was being drawn into some trap, as they would certainly fight harder and especially as we were nearing their village which was still standing; besides, I could not see Custer or any other support, and at the same time the very earth seemed to grow Indians. They were running toward me in swarms and from all directions. I saw I must defend myself and give up the attack mounted. This I did."
During this advance the troops began to cheer in answer to the "whoops" of the Hostiles, and Reno yelled "Stop that noise." Reno, not seeing the "whole outfit" within supporting distance, did not obey his orders to charge the village, but dismounted his command to fight on foot. The movements of the Indians around the left flank and the flight of the scouts caused the left to fall back until the command was on the defensive in the timber and covered by the bank of the old river bed. Reno's loss thus far was one wounded. The position was a strong one, well protected in front by the bank and fringe of timber, somewhat open in the rear, but sheltered by timber in the bottom. Those present differ in their estimates of the length of time the command remained in the bottom after they were attacked in force. Some say "a few minutes"; others "about an hour." While Reno remained there his casualties were few. The Hostiles had him nearly surrounded, and there was some firing from the rear of the position by Indians on the opposite bank of the river. One man was killed close to where Reno was [note: commonly assumed to be Bloody Knife because of what Godfrey said here], and directly afterward Reno gave orders to those near him to "mount and get to the bluffs." [Note: the commonly told story is that Reno's face was spattered with bits of blood and bone when Bloody Knife was shot in the head's head, although this detail is unsubsatantiated.] This order was not generally heard or communicated; while those who did hear it were preparing to execute it, he countermanded the order, but soon afterward repeated the same order "to mount and get to the bluffs," and again it was not generally understood. Individuals, observing the preparations of those on the left,. near Reno, informed their troop commanders who then gave orders to mount. Owing to the noise of the firing and to the absorbed attention they were giving to the enemy many did not know of the order until too late to accompany the command. Some remained concealed until the Indians left and then came out. Four others remained until night and then escaped. Reno's command left the bottom by troop organizations in column, but in a straggling formation. Reno was the foremost in this retreat, or "charge," as he termed it in his report, and after he had exhausted the shots of his revolvers he threw them away. The Hostile strength pushed Reno's retreat to the left, so he could not get to the ford where he had entered the valley, but they were fortunate in striking the river at a fordable place; a pony-trail led up a funnel-shaped ravine into the bluffs. Here the command got jammed and lost all semblance of organization. The Indians fired into them, but not very effectively. There does not appear to have been any resistance, certainly no organized resistance during this retreat. On the right and left of the ravine into which the pony-path led were rough precipitous clay bluffs. It was surprising to see what steep inclines men and horses clambered up under the excitement of danger.
Lieutenant Donald McIntosh was killed soon after leaving the timber. Dr. De Wolf was killed while climbing one of the bluffs a short distance from the command. Lieutenant B. H. Hodgson's horse leaped from the bank into the river and fell dead; the lieutenant was wounded in the leg, probably by the same bullet that killed the horse. Hodgson called out, "For God's sake, don't abandon me"; he was assured that he would not be left behind. Hodgson then took hold of a comrade's stirrup-strap and was taken across the stream, but soon after was shot and killed. Hodgson, some days before the battle, had said, that if he were dismounted in battle or wounded, he intended to take hold of somebody's stirrup to assist himself from the field. During the retreat Private Dalvern, troop "F," had a hand-to-hand conflict with an Indian; his horse was killed; he then shot the Indian, caught the Indian's pony, and rode to the command. Reno's casualties thus far were three officers, including Dr. J. M. De Wolf, and twentynine enlisted men and scouts killed; seven enlisted men wounded; and one officer, one interpreter and fourteen soldiers and scouts missing. Nearly all the casualties occurred during the retreat and after leaving the timber. Scout Charlie Reynolds (white), and Isaiah Dorman (Negro), interpreter from Fort Rice, were killed in the timber on the right of Reno's second position. "Bloody Knife" (Ree) was killed by Reno's side. The Ree scouts continued their flight until they reached the supply camp at the mouth of the Powder, on the 27th. The Crow scouts remained with the command. Mr. F. F. Girard [Fred Gerard], interpreter, informs me that it is his recollection that only one Crow scout "Curley," and "Mitch" Bouyer, Crow interpreter, accompanied Custer's immediate command and that all the other Crow scouts were with Reno. "Curley" probably did not go into the fight at all, but left Custer just before the fighting commenced and went to the high ridge back of the Custer ridge, watched the battle long enough to see that Custer would be defeated and then worked his way to the Bighorn River and waited for the coming of the steamboat Far West the smoke of which could undoubtedly be seen for a long distance.
BENTEEN JOINS RENO
Not long after leaving the water hole Sergeant Kanipe, troop "C", met him with an order from Custer to the commanding officer of the packtrain to hurry it up. The sergeant was sent back to the train with the message; as he passed the column he said to the men, "We've got 'em boys." From this and other remarks we inferred that Custer had attacked and captured the village.
Shortly afterward we were met by a trumpeter, Martin, troop "H," bearing this message signed by Colonel Cook, Adjutant: "Benteen, Come on. Big village Be quick. Bring packs," with the postscript "bring packs."
A riderless horse was the only living thing to be seen in our front. Benteen asked the trumpeter what had been done and Martin informed him that "Indians had `skedaddled,' abandoning the village." The column had been marching at a trot and walk, according as the ground was smooth or broken. We now heard firing, first straggling shots, and as we advanced, the engagements became more and more pronounced and appeared to be coming toward us. The column took the gallop with pistols drawn, expecting to meet the enemy which we thought Custer was driving before him in his effort to communicate with the pack train, never suspecting that our forces had been defeated. We were forming in line to meet our supposed enemy, when we came in full view of the valley of the Little Bighorn. The valley was full of horsemen riding to and fro in clouds of dust and smoke, for the grass had been fired by the Indians to drive the troops out and cover their own movements. On the bluffs to our right we saw a body of troops and that they were engaged. But an engagement appeared to be going on in the valley too. Owing to the distance, smoke and dust, it was impossible to distinguish if those in the valley were friends or foes. There was a short time of uncertainty as to the direction in which we should go, but some Crow scouts came by, driving a small herd of ponies, one of whom said "Soldiers" and motioned for the command to go to the right. Following his directions, we soon joined Reno's battalion, which was still firing. Reno had lost his hat and had a handkerchief tied about his head, and appeared to be very much excited. Benteen's battalion was ordered to dismount and deploy as skirmishers on the edge of the bluffs overlooking the valley. Very soon after this the Indians withdrew from the attack. Lieutenant Hare came to where I was standing and, grasping my hand heartily, said with a good deal of emphasis: "We've had a big fight in the bottom, got whipped, and I am glad to see you." I was satisfied that he meant what he said, for I had already suspected that something was wrong, but was not quite prepared for such startling information. Benteen's battalion was ordered to divide its ammunition with Reno's men, who had apparently expended nearly all in their personal possession. It has often been a matter of doubt whether this was a fact or the effect of imagination. It seems most improbable in view of their active movements and the short time the command was firing, that the "most of the men" should have expended one hundred and fifty rounds of ammunition per man. Lieutenant Hare was ordered to go back and bring up the ammunition pack-mules. Lnckily for us the Indians had not gone back on our trail and discovered and waylaid the pack-train. While waiting for the ammunition pack-mules, Major Reno concluded to make an effort to recover and bury the body of Lieutenant Hodgson. Reno asked for a carbine, saying that he had lost his pistols in the charge. At the same time we loaded up a few men with canteens to get water for the command; they were to accompany the rescuing party. The effort was futile; the party was ordered back after being fired upon by some Indians, who doubtless were scalping the dead near the foot of the bluffs.
A number of officers collected on the edge of the bluff overlooking the valley and were discussing the situation: among our number was Captain Moylan, a veteran soldier and a good one too, watching the scene below. Moylan remarked quite emphatically, "Gentlemen, in my opinion General Custer has made the biggest mistake in his life, by not taking the whole regiment in at once in the first attack.
At this time there were a large number of horsemen, Indians, in the valley. Suddenly they all started down the valley, and in a few minutes scarcely a horseman was to be seen. Heavy firing was heard down the river. During this time the questions were being asked: "What's the matter with Custer, that he don't send word what we shall do?" "Wonder what we are staying here for?" etc., thus showing some uneasiness, but still no one seemed to show great anxiety, nor do I know that any one felt any serious apprehension but that Custer could and would take care of himself. Some of Reno's men had seen Custer's headquarters party, including Custer himself, on the bluffs about the time the Indians began to develop in Reno's front. This party was heard to cheer, and seen to wave their hats as if to give encouragement, and then they disappeared behind the hills or escaped further attention from those below. Major Moylan thinks that the last he saw of Custer's party was about the position of Reno Hill. Major DeRudio thinks he saw Custer on the ridge about opposite where Dr. De Wolf was killed. He says Custer and Tom were dismounted, apparently looking at them through field glasses. Reno was then developing into line of skirmishers. He saw them mount and disappear. Custer's battalion was not seen by Reno's troops after the separation.
It was about the time Custer was last seen that Trumpeter Martin (for the Indians were "skedaddling"), left Cook with Custer's last orders to Benteen, viz: "Benteen, Come on. Big Village. Be quick. Bring packs. Cook, Adjutant. P.S. Bring packs." The repetition in the order would seem to indicate that Cook was excited, flurried, or that he wanted to emphasize the necessity for escorting the packs. It is possible that from a high point Custer had seen nearly the whole camp and force of the Indians and realized that the chances were desperate; but too late to reunite his forces for the attack. Reno was already in the fight and his (Custer's) own battalion was separated from the attack by a distance of two and a half to three miles. He had no reason to think that Reno would not push his attack vigorously. A commander seldom goes into battle counting on the failure of his lieutenant; if he did, he would provide that such a failure should not turn into disaster.
During a long time after the junction of Reno and Benteen we heard firing down the river in the direction of Custer's command. We were satisfied that Custer was fighting the Indians somewhere, and the conviction was expressed that "our command ought to be doing something or Custer would be after Reno with a sharp stick." We heard two distinct volleys which excited some surprise, and, if I mistake not, brought out the remark from some one that "Custer was giving it to them for all he is worth." I have but little doubt now that these volleys were fired by Custer's orders as signals of distress and to indicate where he was.
Captain Weir and Lieutenant Edgerly, after driving the Indians away from Reno's command, on their side, heard the firing, became impatient at the delay, and thought they would move down that way, if they should be permitted. Weir started to get this permission, but changed his mind and concluded to take a survey from the high bluffs first. Edgerly, seeing Weir going in the direction of the firing, supposed it was all right and started down the ravine with the troop. Weir, from the high point saw the Indians in large numbers start for Edgerly, and signaled for him to change his direction, and Edgerly went over to the high point where they remained, not seriously molested, until the remainder of the troops marched down there. The Indians were seen by them to ride about what afterward proved to be Custer's battlefield, shooting into the bodies of the dead men or killing wounded men.
McDougal came up with the pack-train and reported the firing when he reported his arrival to Reno. I remember distinctly looking at my watch at twenty minutes past four, and made a note of it in my memorandum book, and although I have never satisfactorily been able to recall what particular incident happened at that time, it was some important event before we started down the river. It is my impression, however, that it was the arrival of the pack-train. It was at about this time that thirteen men and a scout named Herendeen rejoined the command. They had been missing since Reno's flight from the bottom. Several of them were wounded. These men had lost their horses in the stampede from the bottom and had remained in the timber. When leaving the timber to rejoin, they were fired upon by five Indians, but they drove them away.
RENO ATTEMPTS TO FIND CUSTER
My recollection is that it was about half-past two when we joined Reno. About five o'clock the command moved down toward Custer's supposed whereabouts, intending to join him. The advance went as far as the high bluffs where the command was halted. Persons who have been on the plains and have seen stationary objects dancing before them, now in view and now obscured, or a weed on the top of a hill, projected against the sky, magnified to appear as a tree, will readily understand why our views would be unsatisfactory. The air was full of dust. We could see stationary groups of horsemen, and individual horsemen moving about. From their grouping and the manner in which they sat their horses we knew they were Indians. On the left of the valley a strange sight attracted our attention. Some one remarked that there had been a fire that scorched the leaves of the bushes, which caused the reddish-brown appearance but this appearance was changeable. Watching this intently for a short time with field-glasses, it was discovered that this strange sight was the immense Indian pony-herds.
Looking toward Custer's field, on a hill two miles away we saw a large assemblage. At first our command did not appear to attract their attention, although there was some commotion observable among those near to our position. We heard occasional shots, most of which seemed to be a great distance off, beyond the large groups on the hill. While watching this group, the conclusion was arrived at that Custer had been repulsed, and the firing we heard was the parting shots of the rear guard. The firing ceased, the groups dispersed, clouds of dust arose from all parts of the field, and the horsemen converged toward our position. The command was now dismounted to fight on foot.
RENO FALLS BACK
Weir's and French's troops were posted on the high bluffs and to the front of them; my own troop along the crest of the bluffs next to the river, the rest of the command moved to the rear, as I supposed to occupy other points in the vicinity, to make this our defensive position. Busying myself with posting my men, giving direction about the use of ammunition, etc., I was a little startled by the remark that the command was out of sight. At this time Weir's and French's troops were being attacked. Orders were soon brought to me by Lieutenant Hare, Acting Adjutant, to join the main command. I had gone some distance in the execution of this order when, looking back, I saw French's troop come tearing over the bluffs, and soon after Weir's troop followed in hot haste. Edgerly was near the top of the bluff, trying to mount his frantic horse, and it did seem that he would not succeed, but he vaulted into his saddle and then joined the troop. The Indians almost immediately followed to the top of the bluff, and commenced firing-into the retreating troops, killing one man, wounding others and several horses. They then started down the hillside in pursuit. I at once made up my mind that such a retreat and close pursuit would throw the whole command into confusion, and, perhaps, prove disastrous. I dismounted my men to fight on foot, deploying as rapidly as possible without waiting for the formation laid down in tactics. Lieutenant Hare expressed his intention of staying with me "Adjutant or no Adjutant." The led horses were sent to the main command. Our fire in a short time compelled the Indians to halt and take cover, but before this was accomplished a second order came for me to fall back as quickly as possible to the main command. Having checked the pursuit we began our retreat, slowly at first, but kept up our firing. After proceeding some distance the men began to group together, and to move a little faster and faster, and our fire slackened. This was pretty good evidence that they were getting demoralized. The Indians were being heavily reinforced, and began to come from their cover, but kept up a heavy fire. I halted the line, made the men-take their intervals, and again drove the Indians to cover; then once more began the retreat. The firing of the Indians was not heavy. The bullets struck the ground all about us; but the "ping-ping" of the bullets overhead seemed to have more terrifying influence than the "swish-thud" of the bullets that struck the ground immediately about us. When we got to the ridge in front of Reno's position I observed some Indians making all haste to get possession of a hill to the right.
I could not see the rest of the command, and I knew that that hill would command Reno's position. Supposing that my troop was to occupy the line we were then on, I ordered Hare to take ten men and hold the hill, but, just as he was moving off, an order came from Reno to get back as quickly as possible; so I recalled Hare, again drove the Indians to cover, and ordered the men to run to the lines. This movement was executed, strange to say, without a single casualty.
ON RENO HILL
The Indians now took possession of all the surrounding high points, and opened a heavy fire. They had in the meantime sent a large force up the valley, and soon our position was surrounded. It was now about seven o'clock.
Our position next to the river was protected by the rough, rugged steep bluffs which were cut up by irregular deep ravines. From the crest of these bluffs the ground gently declined away from the river. On the north there was a short ridge, the ground sloping gently to the front and rear. This ridge, during the first day, was occupied by five troops. Directly in the rear of the ridge was a small hill; in the ravine on the south of this hill our hospital was established, and the horses and pack-mules were secured. Across this ravine one troop, Moylan's, was posted, the packs and dead animals being utilized for breastworks. The high hill on the south was occupied by Benteen's troop. Everybody now lay down and spread himself out as thin as possible. After lying there a few minutes I was horrified to find myself wondering if a small sagebrush, about as thick as my finger, would turn a bullet, so I got up and walked alongside the line, cautioned the men not to waste their ammunition; ordered certain men who were good shots to do the firing, and others to keep them supplied with loaded guns.
The firing continued till nearly dark (between nine and ten o'clock), although after dusk but little attention was paid to the firing, as everybody moved about freely.
Of course, everybody was wondering about Custer -- why he did not communicate by courier or signal. But the general opinion seemed to prevail that he had been defeated and driven down the river, where he would probably join General Terry, and with whom he would return to our relief. Quite frequently, too, the question, "What's the matter with Custer?" would evoke an impatient reply.
Indians are proverbial economists of fuel, but they did not stint themselves that night. The long twilight was prolonged by numerous bonfires, located throughout their village. The long shadows of the hills and the refracted light gave a supernatural aspect to the surrounding country, which may account for the illusions of those who imagined they could see columns of troops, etc. Although our dusky foes did not molest us with obtrusive attentions during the night, yet it must not be inferred that we were allowed to pass the night in perfect rest; or that they were endeavoring to soothe us into forgetfulness of their proximity, or trying to conceal their situation. They were a good deal happier than we were; nor did they strive to conceal their joy. Their camp was a veritable pandemonium. All night long they continued their frantic revels: beating tom-toms, dancing, whooping, yelling with demoniacal screams, and discharging firearms. We knew they were having a scalp dance. In this connection the question has often been asked, "If they did not have prisoners at the torture?" The Indians deny that they took any prisoners. We did not discover any evidence of torture in their camps. It is true that we did find human heads severed from their bodies, but these had probably been paraded in their orgies during that terrible night.
Our casualties had been comparatively few since taking position on the hill. The question of moving was discussed, but the conditions coupled with the proposition caused it to be indignantly rejected. Some of the scouts were sent out soon after dark to look for signs of Custer's command, but they returned after a short absence, saying that the country was full of Sioux. Lieutenant Varnum volunteered to go out, but was either discouraged from the venture or forbidden to go.
After dark the troops were arranged a little differently. The horses were unsaddled, and the mules were relieved of their packs; all animals were secured to lariats stretched and picketed to the ground.
Soon after all firing had ceased the wildest confusion prevailed. Men imagined they could see a column of troops over on the hills or ridges, that they could hear the tramp of the horses, the command of officers, or even the trumpet-calls. Stable-call was sounded by one of our trumpeters; shots were fired by some of our men, and familiar trumpet-calls were sounded by our trumpeter immediately after, to let the supposed marching column know that we were friends. Every favorable expression or opinion was received with credulity, and then ratified with a cheer. Somebody suggested that General Crook might be corning, so some one, a civilian packer, I think, mounted a horse, and galloping along the line yelled "Don't be discouraged, boys, Crook is coming." But they gradually realized that the much-wished for reinforcements were but the phantasma of their imaginations, and settled down to their work of digging rifle pits. They worked in pairs, in threes and fours. The ground was hard and dry. There were only three or four spades and shovels in the whole command; axes, hatchets, knives, table-forks, tincups, and halves of canteens were brought into use. However, everybody worked hard, and some were still digging when the enemy opened fire at early dawn, between half-past two and three o'clock, so that all had some sort of shelter, except Benteen's men. The enemy's first salutations were rather feeble, and our side made scarcely any response; but as dawn advanced to daylight their lines were heavily reinforced, and both sides kept up a continuous fusillade. Of course it was their policy to draw our fire as much as possible to exhaust our ammunition. As they exposed their persons very little we forbade our men, except well-known good shots, to fire without orders. The Indians amused themselves by standing erect, in full view for an instant, then dropping down again before a bullet could reach them, but of that they soon seemed to grow tired or found it too dangerous. Then they resorted to the old ruse of raising a hat and blouse, or a blanket, on a stick to draw our fire; we soon understood their tactics. Occasionally they fired volleys at command. Their fire, however, was not very effective. Benteen's troops suffered greater losses than any other, because their rear was exposed to the long-range firing from the hills on the north. The horses and mules suffered greatly, as they were fully exposed to the long range fire from the east.
Benteen came over to where Reno was lying, and asked for reinforcements to be sent to his line. Before he left his line, however, he ordered Gibson not to fall back under any circumstances, as this was the key of the position. Gibson's men had expended nearly all their ammunition, some men being reduced to as few as four or five cartridges. He was embarrassed, too, with quite a number of wounded men. Indeed, the situation here was most critical, for if the Indians had made a rush a retreat was inevitable. Private McDermott volunteered to carry a message from Gibson to Benteen urging him to hasten the reinforcements. After considerable urging by Benteen, Reno finally ordered French to take "M" troop over to the south side. On his way over Benteen picked up some men then with the horses. Just previous to his arrival an Indian had shot one of Gibson's men, then rushed up and touched the body with his "coup-stick," and started back to cover, but he was killed. He was in such close proximity to the lines and so exposed to the fire that the other Indians could not carry his body away. This, I believe, was the only dead Indian left in our possession, that is, at Reno Hill.
This boldness determined Benteen to make a charge, and the Indians were driven nearly to the river. On their retreat they dragged several dead and wounded warriors away with them.
The firing almost ceased for a while, and then it recommenced with greater fury. From.this fact; and their more active movements, it became evident that they contemplated something more serious than a mere fusillade. Benteen came back to where Reno was, and said if something was not done pretty soon the Indians would run into our lines. Waiting a short time, and no action being taken on his suggestion, he said rather impatiently: "You've got to do something here on the north side pretty quick; this won't do, you must drive them back." Reno then directed us to get ready for a charge, and told Benteen to give the word. Benteen called out, "All ready now, men. Now's the time. Give them hell. Hip, hip, here we go!" And away we went with a hurrah, every man of the troops "B," "D," "G," and "K" but one, who lay in his pit crying like a child. The Indians fired more rapidly than before from their whole line. Our men left the pits with their carbines loaded, and they began firing without orders soon after we started. A large body of Indians had assembled at the foot of one of the hills on the north intending probably to make a charge, as Benteen had divined, but they broke as soon as our line started. When we had advanced 70 to 100 yards, Reno called out "Get back, men, back," and back the whole line came. A most singular fact of this sortie was that not a man who had advanced with the lines was hit; but directly after everyone had gotten into the pits again, the one man who did not go out was shot in the head and killed instantly. The poor fellow had a premonition that he would be killed, and had so told one of his comrades.
Up to this time the command had been without water. The excitement and heat made our thirst almost maddening. The men were forbidden to use tobacco. They put pebbles in their mouths to excite the glands; some ate grass roots, but did not find relief. Some tried to eat hard bread, but after chewing it awhile would blow it out of their mouths like so much flour. A few potatoes were given out and afforded some relief. About 11 a. m. the firing was slack, and parties of volunteers were formed to get water under the protection of Benteen's lines. The parties worked their way down the ravines to within a few yards of the river. The men would get ready, make a rush for the river, fill the camp kettles, and return to fill the canteens. Some Indians stationed in a copse of the woods, a short distance away, opened fire whenever a man exposed himself, which made this a particularly hazardous service. Several men were wounded, and the additional danger was then incurred of rescuing their wounded comrades. I think all these were rewarded with medals of honor. [Here is an account of the dangerous water detail by Peter Thompson, who was award the Medal of honor for valor at the Little Bighorn.] By about one o'clock the Indians had nearly all left us, but they still guarded the river. By that time, however, we had about all the water we needed for immediate use. About two o'clock the Indians came back, opened fire, and drove us to the trenches again, but by three o'clock the firing had ceased altogether.
THE HOSTILES MARCH AWAY
Late in the afternoon we saw a few horsemen in the bottom apparently to observe us, and then fire was set to the grass in the valley. About 7 p.m. we saw emerge from behind this screen of smoke an immense moving mass crossing the plateau, going toward the Bighorn Mountains. This moving mass was distant about five or six miles, but looked much nearer, and almost directly between us and the setting sun, now darkened by the smoke and dust ladened atmosphere; the travois with families and belongings and the pony herds was massed, the long column with wide front was skirted by the warriors on guard; thus silhouetted against the redlined western sky-line, their departure was to us a gladsome sight. A fervent "Thank God" that they had at last given up the contest was soon followed by grave doubts as to their motive for moving. Perhaps Custer had met Terry, and was coming to our relief. "Perhaps they were short of ammunition and were moving their village to a safe distance before mak ing a final desperate effort to overwhelm us. Perhaps it was only a ruse to get us on the move and then clean us out," were the conjectures.
The stench from the dead men and horses was now exceedingly offensive, and it was decided to take up a new position nearer the river. The companies were assigned to positions, and the men were put to work digging pits with the expectation of a renewal of the attack. Our loss on the hill had been eighteen killed and fifty-two wounded.
During the night of June 26th, Lieutenant De Rudio, Private O'Neal, Mr. Girard, the interpreter, and Jackson, a half-breed scout, came to our line.
They had been left in the bottom when Reno made his retreat. In attempting to rejoin on the night of the 25th found the approaches guarded by Indians, so they concealed themselves in the brush some distance up the valley.
AFTER THE BATTLE
Tuesday morning, June 27th, we had reveille without the "morning guns," enjoyed the pleasure of a square meal, and had our stock properly cared for. Our commanding officer seemed to think the Indians had some "trap" set for us, and required our men to hold themselves in readiness to occupy the pits at a moment's notice. Nothing seemed determined except to stay where we were. Not an Indian was in sight, but a few ponies were seen grazing down in the valley.
At 9:30 a. m. a cloud of dust was observed several miles down the river. The assembly was sounded, the horses were placed in a protected situation, and camp kettles and canteens were filled with water. An hour of suspense followed; but from the slow advance we concluded that they were our own troops. "But whose command is it?" We looked in vain for a gray-horse troop. It could not be Custer; it must then be Crook, for if it were Terry, Custer would be with him. Cheer after cheer was given for Crook. A white scout, Muggins Taylor, came up with a note from General Terry, addressed to General Custer, dated June 26th, stating that two of our Crow scouts had given information that our column had been whipped and nearly all had been killed; that he did not believe their story, but was coming with medical assistance. The scout said that he could not get to our lines the night before, as the Indians were on the alert. Very soon after this Lieutenant Bradley, 7th Infantry, came into our lines, and asked where I was. Greeting most cordially my old friend, I immediately asked: "Where is Custer?" He replied: "I don't know, but I suppose he was killed, as we counted 197 dead bodies. I don't suppose any escaped." We were simply dumbfounded. This was the first intimation we had of his fate. It was hard to realize; it did seem impossible. Then I took him to Major Reno and there introduced him to the officers.
General Terry and staff, and officers of General Gibbon's column, soon after approached and their coming was greeted with prolonged hearty cheers. The grave countenance of the General awed the men to silence. The officers assembled to meet their guests. There was scarcely a dry eye; hardly a word was spoken, but quivering lips and hearty grasping of hands gave token of thankfulness for the relief and grief for the dead. During the rest of the day we were busy collecting our effects and destroying surplus property. The wounded were cared for and taken to the camp of our new friends of the Montana column. Among the wounded was Saddler "Mike" Madden of my troop, whom I promoted to be sergeant, on the field, for gallantry. Madden was very fond of his grog. His long abstinence gave him a famous thirst. It was necessary to amputate his leg, which was done without administering any anesthetic; but after the amputation the surgeon gave him a good, stiff drink of brandy. Madden eagerly gulped it down, and his eyes fairly danced as he smacked his lips and said: "M-eh, doctor, cut off my other leg."
The question has often been asked if any soldier escaped. In August we camped at the mouth of the Rosebud where we found the carcass of a horse shot in the head; near the horse was a carbine; on the saddle was a small grain sack made of canvas and used by the 7th Cavalry only to carry oats during the march, when detached from the wagons. At the time of the discovery we conjectured that some man had escaped, and on reaching the river had killed his horse for meat and used the saddle straps to tie together a raft. An Indian would not have left the carbine but the man may have abandoned it, either because he was out of ammunition or could not risk the extra weight on his raft. [Note: See Mysteries of the Little Bighorn for more info.]
According to the eye-witness record, this is the way it really happened...
The question has often been asked: "What were the causes of Custer's defeat?"
I should say:
First. The overpowering numbers of the enemy and their unexpected cohesion.
On the first, I will say that we had nothing conclusive on which to base calculations of the numbers, and to this day it seems almost incredible that such great numbers of Indians should have left the agencies, to combine against the troops, without information relating thereto having been communicated to the commanders of troops in the field, further than heretofore mentioned. The second has been mentioned incidentally. The Indians say if Reno's position in the valley had been held, they would have been compelled to divide their strength for the diffetent attacks, which would have caused confusion and apprehension, and prevented the concentration of every able-bodied warrior upon the battalion under Custer; that, at the time of the discovery of Custer's advance to attack, the chiefs gave orders for the village to move, to break up; that at the time of Reno's retreat, this order was being carried out, but as soon as Reno's retreat was assured, the order was countermanded, and the squaws were compelled to return with the pony herds; that the order would not have been countermanded had Reno's forces remained fighting in the bottom. Custer's attack did not begin until after Reno had reached the bluffs.
Of the third we can only judge by our own experience. When cartridges were dirty and corroded, the ejectors did not always extract the empty shells from the chambers, and the men were compelled to use knives to get them out. When the shells were clean no great difficulty was experienced. To what extent this was a factor in causing the disaster we have no means of knowing.
A possible fourth cause was the division of the command. With all the regiment under Custer's personal direction, the results might have been different; but, on the other hand, the whole command might have been wiped out.
The division of the command was not in itself faulty. The same tactics were pursued at the battle of Washita and were successful. That was a surprise attack and there was full co-operation of the separate commands, each commander carried out his instructions. My studies of the battle of the Little Bighorn leaves me in little doubt that had Reno made his charge as ordered, or made a bold front even, the Hostiles would have been so engaged in the bottom that Custer's approach from the Northeast would have been such a surprise as to cause the stampede of the village and would have broken the morale of the warriors.
On the other hand, with the entire command concentrated under Custer's leadership the charge would have been carried home, and, I believe, successfully.
General Custer has been accused of selfish motives in refusing to take the additional forces said to have been offered him while at the mouth of the Rosebud. It is a very delicate matter to analyze motives. In going over letters and diary written during the campaign I find references that may help. General Terry, in his official report makes no mention of the offer, but says: "It was believed to be impracticable to join Colonel Gibbon's troops to Lieutenant-Colonel Custer's force; for more than one-half of Colonel Gibbon's troops were infantry who would be unable to keep up with cavalry in a rapid movement; while to detach Gibbon's mounted men and add them to the 7th Cavalry would leave his force too small to act as an independent body." Thus, it is seen that General Terry had his own reasons for not sending them.
In a letter dated June 10, 1876, 1 find: "The 2nd Cavalry officers are greatly disgusted; one company has to be mounted all the time; the C. O. selects very poor camps for cavalry and their horses are in very poor condition.
The Gatling guns were each hauled by four condemned cavalry horses. They were unfitted for long rapid marches and would have been unable to keep up if there had been such. a demand upon them. The poor condition of the horses in the 2nd Cavalry and in the Gatling gun battery may have decided against both of them.
Colonel Gibbon in his report says: "The first intimation we had of the force and strategy opposed to us was the check given to Custer's column . . ."
Major Brisbin, 2nd Cavalry, in a letter to me, January, 1892, says he was present at the conference on the steamboat "Far West"; that at General Terry's request he traced the routings of the troops on the map and placed pins to show their probable places en route; that Custer turned to the right and left the Rosebud just twenty miles short of his furthermost point on the Rosebud routing.
General Terry says in his report that at the conference he communicated his plan of operations. "It was that Colonel Gibbon's column should cross the Yellowstone near the mouth of the Bighorn, and, thence up that stream with the expectation that it would arrive at the mouth of the Little Bighorn by the 26th. That LieutenantColonel Custer with the whole 7th Cavalry should proceed up the Rosebud until he should ascertain the direction in which the trail discovered by Major Reno led; that if it led to the Little Bighorn it should not be followed,* but that Lieutenant-Colonel Custer should keep still farther to the south before turning toward that river, in order to intercept the Indians should they attempt to pass around his left, and in order, by a longer march, to give time for Gibbon's column to come up. This plan was founded on the belief that the two columns might be brought into co-operating distance of each other, so either of them which should be first to engage might, by a `waiting fight' give time for the other to come up."
The length of the marches has been a subject of comment, it being asserted that the command was subjected to long and exhausting marches. They were: June 22nd, 12 miles; June 23rd, 33 to 35 miles; June 24th, 28 miles; then June 24th, at 11:30 p. m., about 8 miles; then from the divide between the Rosebud and the Little Bighorn to the battle, about 20 miles; in all about 113 miles.
A battle was unavoidable. Every man in Terry's and Custer's commands expected a battle; it was for that purpose, to punish the Indians, that the command was sent out, and with that determination Custer made his preparations. Had Custer continued his march southward-that is, left the Indian trail-the Indians would have known of our movement on the 25th, and a battle would have been fought very near the same field on which Crook had been attacked and forced back only a week before; the Indians never would have remained in camp and allowed a concentration of the several columns to attack them. If they had escaped without punishment of battle Custer would undoubtedly have been blamed.
The 29th and 30th of June were occupied in destroying property left in the Indian village, preparing litters to carry the wounded and transporting them at night to the Bighorn, where they were placed aboard the Far West.
Captain Grant Marsh, master of the "Far West," was the pioneer navigator of the Bighorn and had courageously held his boat there in the face of receding waters, taking chances of stranding his boat on the rocks and shoals of the treacherous river. But Grant Marsh was always ready to take any chances when the services of his government demanded them. He was a man of tremendous energy and resources to fight and overcome all obstacles. July 1st and 2nd the command marched to, and crossed, the Yellowstone and camped on "Pease Bottom," the scene of our fight with the Hostiles in 1873.
At noon July 3rd, the "Far West" loaded with the wounded, Captain Baker's company as escort, and Captain Smith, General Terry's aidde-camp, and Assistant-Adjutant General of the expedition, with dispatches, etc., cast off, swung into mid-stream, and with "full steam ahead" crashing through willows and carroming against mud banks, made her memorable voyage down the Yellowstone and Missouri rivers, reaching Bismarck 11:30 p. m. July 5th, and then giving to the thirty-nine widows at Fort Lincoln, and to the world, the astounding news of Custer's Last Battle.
CHARGES OF DISOBEDIENCE, RASHNESS & DRUNKENNESS
Recent publications of comments on the movements of the troops and the conduct and characteristics of officers prompts me to add to the foregoing account.
Disobedience of Orders
A careful perusal of the orders issued to General Custer will show that the General was given practically a free hand. If any supplemental instructions were given, they were never revealed to the public. General Terry had had no practical experience in Indian warfare. General Custer had that practical experience; he was a student of Indian characteristics; had intimate observations, both in peace and war. He knew that in our centuries of Indian warfare there were more escapes than punishments inflicted for outrages and depredations; that most of these escapes resulted from failure to give vigorous pursuits in following the Hostiles; that the way to find the Hostiles was to follow the trail, stay with it; that success usually depended on surprise attacks; that the most successful surprises came with night approaches and day-break attacks; that forewarned approaches resulted in scatteration into groups or by families and thus escape punishment, and pursuit apt to be disorganized.
It was an absurdity to think that two commands, of 700 and 400, separated by from fifty to one hundred miles, could co-ordinate their movements in that open country and hold the Hostiles for a co-operative attack. In such a case, and the Hostiles had escaped, who would have shouldered the blame?
In the text I have shown that the country toward Tullock's Fork was under surveillance, and it is reasonable to suppose that had circumstances not caused a change of plans for a daybreak attack on the 26th, that Scout Herendeen would have been sent to Gen. Terry's headquarters with information as to plans, etc.
There could not have been any understanding, as contended by some, that the two commands of Custer and Gibbon were to meet at or near the mouth of the Little Bighorn on June 26th.
The number of probable Hostiles, one thousand to fifteen hundred, did not cause any dismay in the command. We knew, of course, that there would be many casualties, which would be the misfortune of individuals, but that there would be a disaster was not considered probable. General Custer had no reason to think that there would be a general exodus from the Indian agencies in the Missouri River and from Nebraska to join the Hostile camps without warning being given in ample time by the Agents, the Bureau of Indian Affairs or Interior Department to the military authorities. Such a warning from General Sheridan, via Fort Lincoln, by courier was received about a week after the battle, too late to avert disaster.
I have seen articles imputing wholesale drunkenness to both officers and enlisted men, including General Custer who was absolutely abstemious. I do not believe that any officer, except Major Reno, had any liquor in his possession. Major Reno had half a gallon keg that he took with him in the field, but I don't believe any other officer sampled its contents. I saw all the officers early in the morning and again at our halt at the divide and when officers' call was sounded to announce the determination to attack, and I saw no sign of intoxication; all had that serious, thoughtful mien, indicating that they sensed the responsibilities before them.
Among the questions propounded has been this one: "If" Reno had advanced "to the sound of the guns" when we heard the firing on Custer's field, would he have rescued Custer's command?
Frankly, I do not believe Custer's command would have been rescued under Reno's leadership. At no time during the battle was his conduct such as to inspire confidence. His faltering advances down the valley, his halting, his falling back to the defensive position in the woods in the old river bed before his command had suffered a single casualty in the ranks; his disorganized, panic retreat to the bluffs with practically no resistance, his conduct up to and during the siege, and until the arrival of General Terry was not such as to inspire confidence or even respect, except for his authority; and there was a time during the night of the 25th, when his authority, under certain conditions, was to be ignored. We thought he ought to go, his attention was called to the firing on the Custer field; it was suggested that he go; he was waiting for the ammunition packs to replenish the ammunition; then he waited for the delayed pack train. We started and marched as far as the first ridge when we beheld the dismounted men crossing the valley, men that had been left when he made his retreat. We halted and waited for them to join, to be mounted and have their ammunition replenished; then we advanced to the high point where we could overlook the Custer battlefield. We saw the commotion on that field when the Hostiles started in our direction. Three troops, D, K and M were then ordered to take positions and hold their ground; with the other four and the pack train Reno returned to our first position on the bluffs, nearly two miles away. Then he ordered the troops in position to fall back at once.
The Custer Myth: A Source Book of Custerania, written and compiled by Colonel W.A. Graham, The Stackpole Co., Harrisburg, PA 1953, p 125 - 149
LT. EDWARD S. Godfrey fought with Frederick Benteen's column and survived the Seige of the Greasy Grass.
Here is Godfrey's account of What Custer Wore.
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